Three accounts.
Real numbers.

The situation

A margin-sensitive giftables brand running almost entirely through Vendor Central — 89% of revenue in 2022. On Vendor Central, Amazon sets retail price. For a brand whose economics depend on holding price, that's not a channel, it's a hostage situation. Revenue was flat to declining and margin was being decided by someone else.

What we did

• +Recommended and executed a full migration from Vendor Central to Seller Central, restoring pricing control
• +Rebuilt the catalog and advertising structure natively on Seller Central rather than porting the VC setup across
• +Diagnosed and fixed the supply chain failure — onboarded a new 3PL and rebuilt forecasting and restock planning
• +Took over day-to-day account management: inventory, buy box, pricing, cases
• +Built dedicated Prime Day and Q4 plans eight to ten weeks ahead of each event

The honest middle

2024 was down 39%. A channel migration and a severe, prolonged out-of-stock situation landed in the same year — you cannot sell inventory you do not have, and ranking earned over years is lost in weeks. That year was spent fixing the foundation rather than chasing revenue.

The result

2025 closed at +116% over 2024 and 26% above the brand's 2022 pre-engagement peak — on a channel where the brand now controls its own pricing. Q4 2025 came in at +210% against the prior year's stockout-hit quarter. Through July 2026, revenue is running +12.6% against the same period in 2025.

The situation

A high-volume beauty accessories brand turning over roughly $6M a year across nearly 200,000 units. At this scale the risk isn't slow growth — it's a suppressed listing during Prime week, a buy box lost to a reseller, or a stockout in the run-up to December.

What we did

• +Full account ownership across catalog, pricing, buy box and inventory
• +Advertising managed against contribution rather than blended ROAS, so growth came from volume rather than discounting
• +Peak-event planning for Prime Day, Black Friday, Cyber Monday and December
• +Continuous account-health monitoring — suppressions, policy flags and cases resolved before they cost sales days

The result

Revenue of $6.6M across the trailing twelve months, up 10% year on year, with units up 15% — meaning growth came from selling more, not charging more. Buy box share held at roughly 99%, and Q4 grew 13.5%.

The strongest single month in the account's history — $876K — landed in June 2026, as we shifted the mid-year deal strategy earlier to capture demand ahead of the field.

The situation

An early-stage educational brand with real product quality and almost no discoverability. Sessions were thin, conversion was under 1%, and entire months passed with negligible orders. Nothing was wrong with the product — nobody was reaching the listing.

What we did

• +Rebuilt listings around how parents and gift buyers actually search, not how the brand described itself
• +Restructured advertising to buy relevance first and volume second, on a small budget
• +Repositioned the range for gifting ahead of Q4, when STEM products are bought as presents rather than supplies
• +Moved the mix toward higher-value bundles, lifting average selling price 37%

The result

Revenue up 78% year on year with units up 40% — and, critically, average selling price up 37%, so the growth came with better economics rather than discounting. The holiday quarter delivered +133% year on year, with December the strongest month in the brand's history.

Conversion on the listing roughly tripled from its starting point, which on a visibility-constrained account is the number that actually matters.